Is China’s demand for the U.S. to “oppose” Taiwanese independence a real threat to decades of foreign policy, or is it a “red herring”—a dramatic distraction in a larger negotiation? Assessing the actual likelihood of a policy shift requires weighing the Trump administration’s known tendencies against the powerful institutional forces that oppose such a change.
The argument that it is a real threat is compelling. President Trump’s transactional approach, his public questioning of the value of alliances, and his stated desire for a trade deal with China all point to a willingness to consider previously unthinkable concessions. The fact that the request is being formally considered, as confirmed by sources, lends this view significant weight.
However, the argument that it may be a red herring also has merit. China may be making an extreme demand that it knows the U.S. is unlikely to accept, in order to make its other, more achievable demands seem reasonable by comparison. It could also be a tactic to sow division within the U.S. government and between the U.S. and its allies.
Powerful countervailing forces also exist. The strong, bipartisan support for Taiwan in Congress, the legal requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act, and the deep-seated resistance within the national security establishment (the “deep state”) all create a powerful institutional inertia against such a radical change. It is not a decision the president can make in a vacuum.
Ultimately, the truth may lie somewhere in between. The threat is real because of the unpredictable nature of the administration, but the institutional obstacles are also formidable. The outcome will depend on the complex interplay between a president’s personal style and the enduring structures of American foreign policy.
